This paper investigates the relationship between managerial stock ownership and the demand for outside directors in the U.K. corporate-control process. We propose and test for evidence of a non-linear association between the proportion of outside board members and the level of insider ownership. Over low and moderate ownership levels, the incentive-alignment effects of insider ownership are predicted to result in a decreasing demand for monitoring in the form of outside board members. However, the costs of entrenchment in the form of reduced market-based monitoring suggest an increasing (internally generated) demand for monitoring when managerial ownership is high.
Introduction
A wide body of research has explored the governance roles of ownership structure and the board of directors (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Kole, 1996; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Millstein and MacAvoy, 1998; Morck et al., 1988) . However, relatively few studies have addressed the ways in which these governance mechanisms interact. Recent notable exceptions are Denis and Sarin (1999) , who examine the evolution of board composition and ownership structure for U.S. firms, and Denis and Denis (1994) , who provide evidence on the governance characteristics of firms controlled by management. This paper contributes to the literature by examining the interaction between managerial ownership and board composition for U.K. firms over a period of intense debate and major governance reforms. Our model predicts that the interaction between managerial ownership and the demand for outside directors is non-linear, a prediction supported by our empirical results.
Economists have long recognized that conflicts of interest occur when ownership and control are separated (Berle and Means, 1932) and that the resultant moral hazard problem creates a demand for monitoring and control mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . The incentive-alignment effects of managerial equity ownership are predicted to reduce the corresponding demand for monitoring mechanisms by outside directors. Consistent with this predicted substitution effect, several studies have reported an inverse (linear) association between managerial ownership and the proportion of outside board members (Denis and Sarin, 1999; Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Weisbach, 1988) . However, while the substitution hypothesis emphasizes the benefits of managerial ownership, offsetting costs have also been identified in recent research (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Jensen, 1993) .
While competitive pressures in the managerial labor market, the market for corporate control and product markets may force managers with low equity stakes to focus on stockholder value creation, such pressures may be less effective when managers control a substantial fraction of the firm's equity. High levels of equity ownership may therefore insulate managers from external market discipline and create so-called managerial entrenchment problems (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988) . The apparent lack of effective external constraints on owner-managers has led some to suggest that a greater emphasis will be placed on control mechanisms, such as the inclusion of outside directors on the board, in owner-managed organizations (Denis and Denis, 1994) .
In this paper, we incorporate the costs and benefits of managerial ownership in a model of the relationship between managerial ownership and board composition.
Incentive-alignment effects predict a negative association between managerial ownership and the demand for outside directors. However, as managerial ownership increases, we predict that an entrenchment threshold will be reached, above which there will be an offsetting additional demand for outside directors. Combining these positive and negative effects leads to the prediction of a non-linear association between managerial ownership and the proportion of outside board members.
Specifically, we predict that the rate of decrease in the demand for outside directors will fall as managerial ownership increases. Depending on the relative magnitudes of the incentive-alignment and entrenchment effects, the demand for outsiders may even start to increase at high managerial ownership levels. This prediction contrasts with the simple linear relation assumed in prior research.
We examine the relation between board composition and managerial ownership for a large sample of U.K. firms. Estimates indicate that a quadratic model provides a better description of the data than a linear model. As managerial stock ownership increases, the proportion of outside board members at first decreases. At managerial ownership levels of approximately 33% (42%) in 1991 (1995) the proportion of outsiders begins to increase with further increases in managerial ownership. Further, analysis of changes in board composition in response to voluntary best practice guidelines issued by the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) (hereinafter, the Cadbury Report) are also consistent with the demand for outside directors being a non-linear function of the level of managerial stock ownership.
Our results support the conclusions of Mayers et al. (1997) that outside directors constitute an important governance mechanism when external constraints on managerial behavior are weak. At first sight, our finding that the demand for outside directors increases at relatively high managerial ownership levels appears to contradict the findings of Denis and Denis (1994) who conclude that owner-managed firms do not use outside directors as a substitute for weak external control. However, it is possible to reconcile these apparently contradictory results. Similar to Denis and Denis, we find that the demand for outside directors is significantly higher when managerial ownership is low than at higher ownership levels. It is only when firms with high levels of managerial ownership are compared with firms having moderate levels of managerial ownership that the increasing demand for outside directors in high ownership firms becomes apparent. Thus, our results simply reflect the use of a different reference group against which owner-managed firms are evaluated. 6 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the role of the board of directors in the governance process and develop the predicted convex relation between the demand for outside directors and the level of managerial ownership. In section 3 we describe the data. In section 4 we report our main empirical findings. Section 5 contains our findings on changes in board composition over the period spanning the Cadbury Report. Finally, in section 6 we present our conclusions.
Theoretical framework

Boards, outside directors, and equity ownership
In firms where decision agents do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their actions, separation of decision management and decision control helps constrain the ability of professional managers to take actions contrary to the interests of outside stockholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . The board of directors is the primary mechanism for achieving top-level separation of the decision management and control functions. The board delegates most decision management functions and many decision control functions to internal agents (managers), while retaining ultimate control over these agents through rights to ratify and monitor key decisions, and rights to appoint, dismiss, and determine the compensation of managers. In short, the board has ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the firm is run in the best interests of stockholders.
In view of the demand for decision expertise, coupled with the requirement for detailed firm-specific knowledge, it is natural that boards contain senior managers from within the organisation (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . However, the inclusion of inside board members conflicts with the decision control function of the board. To mitigate this problem, boards typically include outside directors as guardians of stockholders' interests. However, existing theory is relatively silent as regards the magnitude and determinants of the optimal mix of insider and outside directors.
Recent empirical research sheds some light on this issue by demonstrating a link between effective monitoring and the presence of outsiders on the board in crisis situations (e.g., Brickley, Coles and Terry, 1994; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Weisbach, 1988) . However, our understanding of why firms select particular board structures remains incomplete.
Theory predicts that the demand for monitoring by outside directors will be high when managerial stock ownership is low, and particularly when stockholders are dispersed (Jensen, 1993; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . As managerial ownership increases the incentive-alignment effects of equity ownership will reduce the demand for monitoring by outside directors. Denis and Sarin (1999) , Weisbach (1988) and Zajac and Westphal (1994) provide evidence of the predicted negative relationship between the proportion of outside directors and managerial ownership.
The demand for outside directors in owner-managed firms
Recent research suggests that high levels of managerial stock ownership can be costly to other stockholders (Holderness and Sheehan, 1991) . For example, ownermanagers may lack the managerial skills pertinent to maximizing the value of the firm.
1 They may also have incentives to take value-reducing decisions at the expense of minority stockholders. Such incentives can arise because of the undiversified nature of human and financial capital that may lead to a preference for wealth-decreasing diversification and avoidance of risky opportunities. 2 They can also arise through the power that owner-managers have to expropriate wealth from minority stockholders by paying themselves excessive salaries, negotiating 'sweetheart' deals with other companies they control, withdrawing corporate funds, consuming perquisites, or borrowing from the firm at below market interest rates (Holderness and Sheehan, 1991) . 3 These agency problems are likely to be compounded by the reduced discipline to which owner-managers will be subject in the markets for managerial labor and corporate control (Denis et al., 1997; Morck et al., 1988; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985) .
In an efficient stock market, the value of the firm will reflect the expected costs of entrenchment. While some owner-managers will be inclined to take valuedestroying decisions, others will seek to maximize firm value. If the market is unable to discriminate between owner-managers who maximize value and those who destroy value, the former group will bear costs because their firms will be under-valued. 4 To avoid a pooling equilibrium, value-maximizing owner-managers will attempt to provide credible signals to outside investors that concerns about entrenchment-related 2 Some commentators have argued that the benefits from value diversion will be offset by reductions in direct compensation, leaving total managerial benefits, and hence the total wealth enjoyed by stockholders, unchanged. As such, value diversion no more hurts minority stockholders than does the payment of salaries, bonuses and other familiar forms of compensation (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1982) . Bebchuck and Jolls (1998) show how managerial value diversion can impose a cost on stockholders that may reduce ex ante stock value.
value-destroying behavior are unwarranted. 5 The inclusion of outside directors on the board is one such signal. 
Hypothesis
The preceding analysis suggests that there are two distinct factors determining the relationship between managerial ownership and the demand for outside directors.
Viewed in isolation, the incentive-alignment factor predicts the relationship will be negative throughout the range of managerial ownership. Other things equal, the entrenchment-related demand will be zero until entrenchment becomes an issue, and a positive function of managerial ownership thereafter. Summing the two effects, we anticipate that the negative incentive-alignment factor will dominate at low and moderate inside ownership levels, and then be moderated by the positive entrenchment cost factor at high inside ownership levels. Thus, we predict that the relationship between inside ownership and the demand for outside directors will not be characterized by a simple linear specification. However, the magnitude of the entrenchment-cost factor effect is uncertain. This makes it difficult to predict the exact form of the non-linear relation between board composition and managerial ownership.
Specifically, we cannot predict whether the relation will include a turning point (i.e., be a U-shaped function) or whether the demand for outside directors will simply be a 5 Typical venture capital arrangements are one example of effective board monitoring in high managerial ownership firms.
6 Some prior research has cast doubt on the monitoring effectiveness of boards in ownermanaged firms. See, for example, Denis and Denis (1994) and Holderness and Sheehan (1988) . However, Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 315) suggest that the apparent domination of boards by owner-managers may be more apparent than real. Board acquiescence may simply reflect a consensus that board insiders are effective in pursuing stockholder value maximization.
decreasing convex function of managerial ownership. The exact nature of the relationship is therefore an empirical issue on which the remainder of this paper attempts to shed some light.
Data description
Our empirical tests are based on a sample of non-financial firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). We examine samples of firms for two years representing the pre-Cadbury Report period (1991) and the post-Cadbury Report period (1995) . 7 For each year, we identify the largest 1000 firms listed on the LSE, ranked by beginning-of-year market capitalization and excluding utilities. 8 We also at the fiscal year-end. 10 Given the uncertainty associated with the voting and control rights of non-beneficial stockholdings, we restrict our definition of ownership to beneficial stockholdings only. 11 We also exclude stock held in employee pension and stock option plans together with that held by outside board members. Since senior officers (e.g., managing director, finance director, etc.) are almost always board members in the U.K., we are confident that this measure represents a reliable proxy for the level of managerial ownership. Of the initial firm-year observations for which board data are available, 218 were eliminated due to missing ownership data, resulting in a sample of 1226 firm-year observations. Annual sample sizes are 626 and 600 for 1991 and 1995, respectively, with 428 firms having data for both sample years. 
Governance-related disclosures improved with the adoption of the Cadbury
Report by the LSE in 1993. As a consequence, we are able to classify outside directors for the 1995 sample according to whether they are "independent" or "grey".
12 Sample firms are relatively evenly distributed across industry groups. For example, in the 1991 (1995) sample, 4 (7) industries contain at least 20 firms and 15 (18) industries contain at least 10 firms. In both sample periods, the largest industry group is engineering with 35 and 36 firms in 1991 and 1995, respectively.
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Outside directors whose board tenure exceeds ten years, who are related to management, who are ex-managers, consultants, lawyers, financial advisors, or who are involved in a reciprocal interlock are defined as greys. 13 In the 1995 sample, 31%
of directors are independent outsiders and 13% are greys. Table 2 shows that there is considerable variation across firms in the level of managerial ownership. In almost fifty percent of cases, managers own less than one percent of their firm's stock.
However, in approximately eleven percent of firms in 1991 (eight percent in 1995), managerial ownership exceeds thirty percent. Unreported analysis indicates that high (i.e. greater than 30%) managerial ownership firms tend to be smaller (in terms of market value and total assets) than low managerial ownership firms. They are also smaller than the average firm in the same industry. These findings are consistent with the inverse relation between size and managerial ownership documented by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) for the U.S.
Cross-sectional evidence on board composition and managerial ownership
Main results
The hypothesis developed in section 2 suggests that the demand for outside directors will be a convex function of the level of managerial ownership. This section reports cross-sectional evidence on this issue. In regression (2), we test whether the relation between board composition and managerial ownership is convex by adding to the model a term equal to the squared value of managerial ownership. The coefficient on this variable is positive and significant at the 0.01 level in both years. The estimated coefficient on the main managerial ownership term continues to be negative and significant, but addition of the quadratic ownership term leads to a substantial increase in its magnitude. A comparison of regressions (1) and (2) reveals that the coefficient on managerial ownership more than doubles (trebles) in 1991 (in 1995). The improved specification of regression (2) is also reflected in the increased explanatory power of the model in both sample periods.
The larger (in magnitude) coefficients on the insider ownership variables in the quadratic specifications suggest that prior linear models estimated in the literature may have understated the marginal rate of substitution between outside directors and managerial ownership at lower levels of ownership. For example, based on regression
(1) for 1991, the estimated marginal rate of substitution is 0.284. In contrast, 15 Although managerial ownership is endogenous (Himmelberg et al. 1999 ), we treat it as a predetermined variable in our empirical analysis. In unreported tests, we employed a twostage least squares procedure to endogenize both board composition and managerial ownership. The board composition model was identical to regression (3) in proportion of outsiders for firms with managerial ownership below 10% in 1995 is 0.46 (0.5), compared with 0.40 (0.37) for firms with managerial ownership above 33% (differences significant at the 0.01). Similar results hold for 1991. This is consistent with the finding reported by Denis and Denis (1994) that the proportion of outside directors is lower in owner-managed firms, relative to a control sample of diffusely held firms.
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In regression (3) of table 4 we test the sensitivity of the above results to the inclusion of a series of control variables that may be associated with board composition. Prior research suggests that the proportion of outside directors may be related to board size, the presence of a dominant individual on the board, external ownership structure, firm size, leverage, the degree of product market competition, and business complexity. We include proxies for these additional factors in regression 
. 18 Of the control variables included in model (3), the Chairman/CEO dummy is negative and significant in both periods, indicating that the proportion of outside directors is lower for firms that combine the roles of Chairman and CEO. The demand for outsiders is positively related to the size of the largest external stockholding, although the magnitude of the association is weak. None of the other control variables display any consistent significant association with board composition across the two sample periods.
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A comparison of regressions (2) and (3) shows that the nonlinear relation between insider ownership and the fraction of outside directors is still clearly present.
The turning points estimated from regression (3) are similar to those obtained from regression (2) and both estimates lie within the feasible range for entrenchment.
Further, a sufficient number of observations lie above the implied turning points in each period to suggest that the results are reliable. For example, 5.7% of the sample (24 firms) have managerial ownership greater than 41% in 1991, while 6.2% of the 1995 sample (29 firms) have managerial ownership greater than 36%. These findings provide assurance that the non-linear association between board composition and insider ownership in regression (2) is not sensitive to the inclusion of other factors that have been advanced as potential determinants of board composition.
Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we report the results of a series of additional robustness tests.
We begin by assessing the sensitivity of our 1995 results to the definition of outside 18 Missing data for control variables means that the number of observations used to estimate regression (3) is less than for regressions (1) and (2).
directors. We re-estimate regressions (1) -(3) using the proportion of independent outside directors as the dependent variable. Results are even stronger than those reported in table 3. For regression (2), the estimated coefficient on managerial ownership is -0.921 while that on the quadratic term 1.429. Similarly, for regression (3), the coefficient on managerial ownership is -0.736 while that on the quadratic term is 1.131. All these estimated coefficients are significant at the 0.001 level. The implied turning points for managerial ownership are approximately 32%.
In a further test, we also examine whether our results are sensitive to outliers.
In particular, the positive coefficient on the squared insider ownership term could be due to a small number of firms with relatively high insider ownership and a relatively high number of outside directors. To examine this possibility, we trimmed the distributions of board composition and insider ownership at their 5th and 95th
percentiles before re-estimating regressions (2) and (3). The significant quadratic relation between board composition and insider ownership is still clearly evident in the regressions using the truncated samples.
In the regressions reported in table 3, the dependent variable (board composition) is bounded at one and zero, giving rise to potential specification bias (Greene, 1990) . To address this issue, we follow Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998) and apply a logit transformation to the proportion of outside directors, before reestimating regressions (1) -(3) using weighted least squares. 20 In all cases, the 19 We also tested the sensitivity of our results for regression (1) to the inclusion of the same set of control variables. There was no material impact on the coefficient on managerial ownership and the significance of the control variables was similar to regression (3). 20 The logit transformation used for the dependent variable is
OUT is the proportion of outside board members.
conclusions based on models estimated using the transformed data are identical to those presented above.
It is possible that the relation between insider ownership and board composition reflects common industry factors. To investigate whether our results are a spurious by-product of a deeper relation between board composition, insider ownership and industry, we repeat our regressions after including industry dummy variables for each Datastream level-6 industry group. In all cases, the coefficient estimates for the insider ownership and insider ownership squared terms are virtually identical to those reported in table 3. Based on these findings, we conclude that the non-linear association between insider ownership and the demand for outside directors is not due to omitted industry effects.
We interpret the increasing use of outside directors among firms with high managerial ownership as the result of an endogenous demand for decision control expertise in such firms. Work on the links between board composition and firm performance, however, suggests a competing explanation. In particular, Denis and Sarin (1999) , Bhagat and Black (1997) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
The Cadbury Report and changes in board composition
Our cross-sectional tests present robust evidence of a non-linear association between board composition and managerial ownership. However, there remains the possibility that both board composition and managerial ownership are determined by other common characteristics that are unobservable to the researcher. To address this issue, we conduct additional tests in which we examine changes in the number of outside board members in response to the Cadbury Report's (1992) "best practice" recommendation for a minimum of three outsider directors. To the extent that this recommendation represents an exogenously determined, objective benchmark against which "good" board structure can be assessed, firms wishing to signal the quality of their governance system are expected to face strong incentives to comply with the proposal.
If the relation between the demand for outside directors and managerial ownership is non-linear then, conditional on a firm failing to meet the Cadbury Report's recommendation in 1991, we would expect the probability of compliance in 1995 to be higher for firms with relatively high and relatively low managerial ownership. We test this prediction by first isolating firms that appear in both our 1991 and 1995 samples and that have fewer than three outside board members in 1991. Of the 293 firms with complete data (i.e., board composition, managerial ownership, and control variables) for both sample periods, 151 have fewer than three outside directors in 1991. Our tests therefore examine whether these firms subsequently choose to comply with the Cadbury Report's recommendation on outside directors, and whether the probability of compliance is associated with the level of insider ownership. Table 4 However, the effect is not significant at conventional levels (p = 0.299). In model (2), we also include the quadratic ownership term. The effect is dramatic: the estimated coefficient on the quadratic term is positive and significant at the 0.008 level, while the managerial ownership coefficient is negative and significant at the 0.004 level.
Model (3) further extends the set of explanatory variables to include other potential determinants of board composition. The non-linear association between the probability of compliance and the level of managerial ownership is again evident. The managerial ownership term is negative and significant while the quadratic term is positive and significant. Findings from model (3) also suggest that the probability of compliance is positively related to firm size and total board size, and negatively related to financial performance (as measured by return on assets). The implied turning point for insider ownership from model (3) proportion of independent outside director appointments. In sum, these findings suggest that board appointments made by high ownership firms reflect genuine attempts by entrenched managers to improve the level of board monitoring.
Summary and conclusions
There is a growing literature examining boards of directors and their importance as a corporate governance mechanism. However, little is currently known a Outside directors are defined as board members classified as "non-executive" in the annual report. b Independent outside directors are those board members classified as non-executive in the annual report that have no business or personal affiliations with management. c Insider ownership is defined as the equity ownership of all inside board members, excluding non-beneficial holdings and stock held in employee pension and stock option plans d External blockholders are defined as non-board members who own at least 3% of the firm's outstanding equity. e Concentration ratios are computed at the Datastream level-4 industry level and are defined as the sum of total sales revenue for the largest four firms in the industry, divided by the aggregate sales revenue for the industry. f As reported by Datastream. g Diversification is measured as one minus the Herfindahl index of product diversification, computed using sales revenue from 3-digit SIC segments. b External blockholders are defined as those holders of at least 3% of the firms stock that are not related to the board of directors and do not own stock over which managers have some voting authority. c Concentration ratios are computed at the Datastream level-4 industry level and are defined as the sum of total sales revenue for the largest four firms in the industry, divided by the aggregate sales revenue for the industry. d Diversification is measured as one minus the Herfindahl index of product diversification, computed using sales revenue from 3-digit SIC segments. e Based on a cut-off probability of 0.5. Table 5 Estimated probabilities of compliance with the Cadbury Report's recommendation for a minimum of three outside directors in 1995 (conditional on non-compliance in 1991), evaluated at alternative levels of insider ownership. The probabilities are computed using model (3) in table 4 relating the probability of compliance to the level of managerial ownership and other potential determinants of board composition. The regression is estimated using 151 firms with data for 1991 and 1995 and which had fewer than three outside directors in 1991. The base case is where all explanatory variables are measured at their means: probability of compliance with the recommendation on outside directors in 1995 at the base case = 0.2888. b Implied probabilities are reported for different percentiles (P) and quartiles (Q) of the insider ownership distribution. Implied probabilities are calculated with all continuous variables (with the exception of insider ownership) set equal to their means and all binary variables set equal to one. Table 6 Outside director appointments for firms with at least three outside board members in 1995 but with less than three outside directors in 1991, partitioned by managerial ownership. The starting point for the sample of director appointments is the 428 firms with board composition and insider ownership data for both 1991 and 1995. Of these, 92 firms have fewer than (at least) three outside directors in 1991 (1995) . Tests are based on 228 new outside board members (grey's and independent) made by these 92 firms, of which 158 were classified as independent. New outside directors are defined as outside board members of firm i in 1995 that were not board members in 1991. Grey's are defined as outside directors whose board tenure exceeds ten years, who are ex-managers of the firm or related to the top management team, who are consultants, lawyers, financial advisors, or who involved in a reciprocal interlock. All remaining outsiders are defined as independent. Managerial ownership is defined as the equity ownership of all inside board members, excluding non-beneficial holdings and stock held by employee pension or stock option plans. 
